The Institutional Strategy of Brazilian Supreme Court on the Legislative Process
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Abstract
The Brazilian Federal Constitution established a framework of laws that allow for the Supreme Court to act over the social life and branches of the government. Nevertheless, the analysis of the federal legislative process by the strategic institutional approach demonstrates that the panorama among state departments is not asymmetric. In fact, the separation of powers game can create groups of scenarios that generate decisions based on the preference of individual judges, or that restrict the autonomy of the Court when criticism or external retaliations threaten its authority.
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